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I am particularly honored to have Dean Treanor with us
today, the Dean of my Law School, the Dean of the Law School
where I went, the Dean of the Law School where I teach. He is
going to introduce the rest of the program on corporate
governance, including the panel with Secretary Peterson and
Governor Bies's keynote address.
With that, I turn it over to the Dean of the Fordham
University School of Law, Dean William Treanor.
DEAN TREANOR: Thanks very much, Professor
Rechtschaffen.
Welcome, on behalf of the entire Law School community. I
am here to welcome you to the International Symposium on Risk
Management and Derivatives, which addresses the critical issues of
corporate governance and responsibility.
I would like to thank all the distinguished panelists that we
have today. If you look at the program brochure, it is a remarkable
group. It is a congregation of people who are outstanding leaders
in the field.
I would also like to extend a special welcome to the
Symposium's keynote speaker, Governor Susan Schmidt Bies of
the Federal Reserve System. Thank you very much for coming.
And I would like to recognize the chairs of the Symposium's
various panels: Professor Steven Raymar of the Fordham School of
Business-thank you for chairing a panel, Professor Raymar; the
Honorable Peter Peterson, Chair of the Blackstone Group and
Chair of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who will be
presiding over this panel; and Howard Rubenstein, President of
Rubenstein Associates, Inc.
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Carl Felsenfeld of
our faculty, who directs the Fordham Institute on Law and
Financial Services; Professor Jill Fisch, who directs the Fordham
Center for Corporate, Securities, and Financial Law; and especially
Professor Alan Rechtschaffen, who is the Symposium Chair and a
member of our adjunct faculty. He originally envisioned the need
for a conference like this seven years ago and has worked tirelessly
since then to make this vision a reality.
The topics addressed by our distinguished panelists include
accounting, corporate governance, and public relations, areas
which have always been fundamental to the world of business and
PANEL 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
the world beyond. Today, as we all know, these topics are more
important than ever, as the securities industry tries to bolster
investor confidence in a system that has recently been under siege
from without and from within.
The issues which our panelists address today are equally
important both to the financial industry and to the average citizen.
Never before in our nation's history have so many members of the
public been so invested in capital markets, and perhaps not since
the Great Depression have so many individuals lost as much trust
in the ability of the corporate and financial world to keep its own
house in order.
The dialogue that is presented today is an important step in
addressing the critical issues that will continue to challenge the
business community in the days and years to come.
Again, I thank all of you for sharing your time and your talent
on these issues of national significance, and I wish you a very
successful Symposium.
Now I would like to introduce the panel on corporate
governance issues.
The Panel Chair is the Honorable Peter Peterson, who is one
of the best-known and most influential leaders in the business
community of our time. In addition to currently serving as Chair of
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, he is also Chair of the
Blackstone Group, a private investment firm, which he co-founded
in 1985, and a Director of Sirius Satellite Radio.
Mr. Peterson served as Chairman and CEO of Lehman
Brothers from 1973-1977, and after the merger with Kuhn, Loeb
served as Chairman and CEO of Lehman Brothers, Kuhn, Loeb
until 1984. Mr. Peterson is currently Chair of the Council on
Foreign Relations and he is Founding Chairman of the Institute for
International Economics. He is a former United States Secretary
of Commerce and Chairman of the National Commission on
Productivity during the Nixon Administration, and under President
Gerald Ford he chaired the Quadrennial Commission on
Executive, Legislative and Judicial Salaries.
Mr. Peterson has been named by the United States Junior
Chamber of Commerce as one of the "Ten Outstanding Men" in
the nation. Very early in his career, in 1972, he was named as one
of the "Most Important Americans Under Forty," a recognition
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whose accuracy would be proven time and time again over a long,
distinguished career in the public and private sectors.
An author of numerous influential publications on economics,
Mr. Peterson is a summa cum laude graduate of Northwestern
University and holds an MBA with Honors from the University of
Chicago. He also holds honorary doctorates from a number of
universities, including his Alma Mater Northwestern.
Our panelists today are John "Neel" Foster, who is a member
of the Financial Accounting Standards Board and a member of the
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council; and Professor
Jeffrey Colon of our faculty.
I bring you Mr. Peterson, who will then introduce and present
the rest of our panel.
Again, thank you very much for coming.
MR. PETERSON: Thank you for that overblown
introduction.
I am glad you did not refer to me, as I was once referred to, as
a "powerful Secretary of Commerce," which started me in a career
of collecting oxymorons, because anybody who has been in
Washington knows there has never been a powerful Secretary of
Commerce.
As far as my books are concerned, I specialize in worst-sellers.
The most unkind, but accurate, comment about my latest
book, called Gray Dawn, was by Ted Sorenson, who said "Gray
Dawn is a book that once you put it down, you won't be able to
pick it up."
I guess the reason I am here is that, as some of you at least
know, The Conference Board decided to set up a Commission on
Public Trust and Private Enterprise and I was asked to co-chair it
with John Snow, who used to chair The Business Roundtable.
And, since I was also presumably educated at the University of
Chicago, where our patron saint was Adam Smith-I am not old
enough to have known him personally, but he tried to teach us the
concept of comparative advantage.
Anybody asked to join commissions has to ask, "Well, what is
different about this one?" I have seen the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE") and The Business Roundtable reports. John
Snow and I finally decided to take on this project on three grounds.
First, that it would not be just a business or a financial group,
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because this problem in public trust is clearly metastasizing
throughout the entire society. So, in addition to having former
CEOs, we wanted highly trusted former government regulatory
officials. We have Paul Volcker, we have Chuck Bowsher,
Comptroller General, Arthur Levitt, former SEC Chairman, and
Senator Rudman. We have a professor of business ethics, which
some would also consider an oxymoron. She is Lynn Paine,
Professor of Business Ethics at the Harvard Business School.
And, very importantly, because the investor community has
been remarkably moot, or passive, or whatever you wish to call it
on this, we have John Biggs of TIAA-CREF; we have Jack Bogle,
a remarkably outspoken, free-thinking founder of Vanguard, and
Peter Gilbert, the head of investments of the Pennsylvania State
System.
Ultimately, we are going to try to make a difference in two
ways: not only coming up with recommendations that we hope are
sensible, but we are going to try to get the business community and
the investor community organized. You will be seeing some
advertisements in which we are going to ask for the support of
these organizations.
I happen to be of Greek descent, so I always look for words of
Greek origin. I do not know if you have seen "My Big Fat Greek
Wedding," but you should if you have not. Anyone brought up
Greek understands that everything began and ended with the
Greeks. So when I see a word that has a Greek origin, I kind of go
for it.
There is a wonderful word, called iatrogenic, which means
caused by (genic) the doctor (iatro). One of the reasons we are
very anxious to see the private sector start showing some
leadership is I genuinely feel that when Congress gets involved in
such delicate matters as executive compensation, you can almost
be sure that the effect will be iatrogenic--that is, it will create
symptoms and diseases that can be worse than the original
problem.
Now, public trust. It has been customary for people with my
kind of business background to utter a clich&--"there are just a few
rotten apples." I think it does not matter what those of us in
business think. If we are dealing with the public, we have to think
like the public thinks.
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I have been appalled at the extent and level and depth of
public anger, fear, and disrespect that exists. Forty-three percent
of the Americans in a recent survey said they believed all
executives engaged in these shenanigans. Another 36 percent
believe "many or most" do. And only 15 percent buy our "few
rotten apples" idea.
Humor is useful in life. I do not know if you saw this cartoon.
It was unkind and unfair, but I think it conveyed a public attitude.
It shows one of Saddam Hussein's deputies coming up to him and
saying: "Mr. President"--or whatever they call him--"those
Americans have gone too far. They are now beginning to call you
a CEO."
So there is a pervasive public view that I think something has
to be done. The reasons we should care are obvious. Ours is a
country-we have Governor Bies here of the Federal Reserve
Board-where we spend much time talking about our abysmally
low savings rate, our outsized current account deficit and how we
need to get $500 billion a year from abroad. We know how terribly
important trust in our capital markets is, and we think that reason
argues very persuasively at the macro level for doing something
about it.
Now, I am going to talk for a few minutes about one subject.
We probably violated the antitrust laws, but I have assigned each
of our panelists a different market sector so we did not compete
with each other. I am going to talk about the issue we have tackled
first on the Commission because it is the toughest issue, it is the
most toxic issue, and it is the one most people have not talked
about, but which I believe is at the absolute root of the breakdown
in confidence, and that is executive compensation.
You are probably familiar with the fact that growth of CEO
compensation in the last ten years has been ten times faster than
that of the average worker. And we can understand if we step
back from our illusions or our clich6s, why the average American
might say, "You know, you business types talk about productivity
and the importance of linking productivity to wages. Are you
saying that your productivity has grown ten times faster than ours
has?"
The media has covered this subject, shall we say, very
extensively. We see The Financial Times pointing out that
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executives made $3.1 billion in companies that went bankrupt,
referring to it as "the stunning payoff for corporate failure."' You
probably saw the Fortune cover which said: "You bought, they
sold: How hundreds of greedy executives sold $66 billion worth of
stock."2 So there is a pervasive attitude out there that we really
need to understand.
We got the help of Simpson Thatcher and Towers Perrin who
at least reduced my level of ignorance., I had not understood,
frankly, what the main drivers were of this huge growth in
compensation and the major role of stock options.
Between 1990 and 2000, stock options went from 8 percent of
total equity to over 16 percent. And you combine that with the
stock market "bubble," or whatever you wish to call it, and the
combination of huge quantities-unprecedented quantities-of
stock, a bull stock market, very limited holding periods, very
limited ownership requirements-which gave rise to what I think is
really bothering the American people, which is executives making
hundreds of millions of dollars in some highly publicized cases
while they presided over failed or failing companies.
Now, one of the iatrogenic effects of congressional
involvement in executive compensation was the 1993 limit on the
deductibility of cash compensation above $1 million. That, plus the
accounting treatment of stock options, where they did not have to
be expensed even though they were very large tax deductions for
stock options, the latter I have found in my speaking around the
country the public does not appreciate. When I tell them that
Microsoft got a $3.1 billion tax deduction in 1999 or Cisco got a
$2.5 billion tax deduction in the year 2000, most people are very
surprised.
So the combination of not expensing these options and getting
a big tax deduction created the feeling that these options were
more or less free. And they were given in overwhelming
quantities.
One of the delicious ironies of this problem that I have
discovered is that one kind of option that is not expensed is the
1. Len Cheng, Survivors Who Laughed All the Way to the Bank, FIN. TIMES
(London), July 31, 2002, at 10.
2. Mark Gimein, You Bought. They Sold., FORTUNE, Sept. 2, 2002, at 64.
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fixed-price option, which is about 99.5 percent of the total options.
Options that try to relate compensation to performance-for
example, restricted stock grants that say "you will get X grants of
stock if corporate earnings go up this much for Y years"; or
performance-oriented options that say "if you earn a rate of return
higher than the cost of capital, or higher than the Dow Jones, then
you get stock"--all of those performance-based stock options are
expensed.
So, unintentionally I think, what has happened is we have had
this tremendous de-linkage between performance, on the one
hand, and compensation, on the other, and in the aggravated cases
it is really de-linked because we have negative performance and
huge compensation, which I think is at the root of this problem.
Now, another thing I discovered is that to say that the West
Coast high-tech industry's enthusiasm for expensing options is
restrained would be an understatement. What I did not know until
we looked into this was the immense variability in the role that
expensing options would play on reported earnings, which,
combined with the huge number of options, has tremendous
impact.
For example, in a very interesting study done by Merrill
Lynch, they took the entire S&P 500 and they broke it down by
industry. What they found was that if you expense options in most
of the industries, the effect on reducing reported earnings is
typically somewhere between 3 and 10 percent. In the case of the
information technology industries, it is 70 percent.3 So you can
understand how the combination of huge numbers of options with
this substantial effect on decreasing reported earnings would create
a problem of earnings comparability.
The executive compensation philosophy of the Commission, if
I can summarize it, on compensation is as follows:
" A true focus on long term;
" Secondly, a focus on operating performance, not just stock
performance; and
" A true focus on long-term ownership.
3. Lou Dobbs, The End of the Era of Excess, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 30, 2002, at 54.
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Now, over the long term, the experts tell me, there is a high
correlation between stock prices and performance. It is over the
short term that there are these deviations.
Now, had there been a high correlation between compensation
and performance, I think we would have had a very different
public mindset than we do at the present time.
We make a number of recommendations. I will try to rush
through some of the more important ones. The fact that we
achieved actual unanimity on twenty-two of them and unanimity-
minus-one-Andy Grove of Intel---on the expensing of options is
some indication that a group of respected Americans can achieve
some consensus when they really look at this situation.
First, the compensation committee, in our view, has to take
charge, which they had not taken in many cases, and in particular,
take charge of retaining any outside compensation consultants. If
we have time, we can talk about it. I think this assumption that
outside compensation consultants, outside law firms, outside
auditors, are truly outside is one of the fundamental issues that has
to be explored in corporate governance.
I am afraid in too many cases, and most certainly in
compensation consultants, these outsiders came to see the
management, not the independent directors, as their client. As
their management-generated fees go up, we should not be
surprised if they would be restrained in their enthusiasm to bite the
hand that they perceive as feeding them. In 2000, consulting fees
were about three times the auditing fees. Compensation
consultants got a wide variety of fees that were not directly related
to executive compensation. So we think it is essential that the
independent directors pick the compensation consultants and they
both hire them and fire them.
I have become a great booster of Warren Buffet, not that he
needs it. He has been highly supportive of our effort. He
appeared at our press conference recently. He referred to
compensation consultants as being named "Ratchet, Ratchet &
Ratchet," on the grounds that there is a tendency to keep
ratcheting up compensation. Having been on eight compensation
committees, I do not ever recall a case where a compensation
consultant said, "You guys are getting paid too much."
Second, the compensation committee, in our view, should be
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unconstrained by industry averages and statistics and by current
levels, which in some cases may be excessive.
Garrison Keillor in "Lake Wobegone" talks about a wonderful
place where everybody was above average. In our approach to
compensation, we almost assume everybody must somehow be
above average.
If current levels are excessive-and certainly, in certain
companies I think they are-we want to avoid any notion that "last
year the guy got $11 million, so let's start from there and figure out
how to pay him more." We ought to go back to baseline-zero-
based budgeting.
Third, we think, obviously, as you can tell, the options should
be expensed. I have heard all the arguments for and against.
Perhaps we will have some time to discuss it. But we think FASB
and the International Accounting Standards Board should have a
uniform system to get comparability.
Fourth, we think senior management and directors should do
two things with options. First, they should have a substantial
holding period. Secondly, the senior officers should have very
substantial long-term ownership requirements, even until they
retire if they wish, to achieve this unity between long-term
corporate interests and executive compensation.
Fifth, we believe that companies should assiduously avoid the
use of special-purpose entities to enrich executives. I read a most
illuminating, but melancholy, report by the Dean of the Texas Law
School on the special entities in the case of Enron, and it is indeed
very sober reading when you realize the immense conflicts of
interest it created between the employees and the corporation.
Sixth, we support very conspicuous disclosure of all
employment agreements, all arrangements-and we mean
conspicuous.
One of the circular arguments we ran into for why this should
not be disclosed and that should not be disclosed is "it is in the
footnotes." The argument seems to be: "Well, they already know
it; it is in the footnotes." Well: "If they already know it, why are
you objecting to making it conspicuous?" Given what has
happened recently on retirement perks and so forth, we come out
very strongly for full and conspicuous disclosure.
Seventh, we think that stockholders should approve any and
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all aspects of stock equity compensation, and most certainly in
terms of re-pricing of options. The most controversial
recommendation that we made, but, ironically enough, we did
achieve unanimity, for whatever that is worth, is the notion of
adverse notice of the intention to sell stock.
As we look at what bothers the American public in all these
headlines that I mentioned, it is the notion that somehow
somebody must have known something before they sold the shares;
otherwise, how could they have made this much money and then
the stock soon tanks by over 75 percent, as in the case of the
Fortune story. We, therefore, suggest that new techniques be
developed for advance notice of the intention to sell stock, because
we think that gets at what is truly bothering a lot of people. The
combination, we think, of a substantial holding period and long-
term ownership, plus advance notice would have alleviated a lot of
what we have now observed.
I have gone on too long. Let me now ask Mr. Colon if he will
talk about independence of directors, including investment
bankers.
MR. COLON: Thank you very much.
I want to briefly talk about the current proposals that have
been put forth by both the NYSE and NASDAQ regarding
corporate governance.
The NYSE's report grew out of a request by Harvey Pitt to
have the Exchange review its corporate governance standards. As
a result, there were meetings and testimony was taken, and the
proposal that was submitted to the SEC on the 16th reflects the
findings of these meetings.
I am going to briefly describe what I believe are the most
important points, critique them, and then raise some questions. I
think it would also be very instructive if persons with actual
experience of serving on boards of directors were to give their
views as to the possible or probable effects that these listing
standards have on corporations.
First, some procedural background. The NYSE has submitted
its report to the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). It
has not yet been published for public comments, and the SEC is
probably reviewing it. When it is published for public comments,
interested parties can weigh in with their views. And then, it will
2003]
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hopefully be enacted relatively quickly.
The NASDAQ proposal has not yet been submitted to the
SEC. Apparently, it is being reviewed now by SEC personnel.
There are three parts of the report that I am going to focus on.
The first is the requirement that the board of directors of
NYSE listed companies be comprised of a majority of independent
directors. Currently, there is no such requirement by either
NASDAQ or the NYSE. There is currently a requirement of the
NYSE that each listed company have three independent directors.
From my observations, most large companies-the Intels and
Microsofts of the world-have boards of directors that are largely
independent, including Enron, which everyone recognized had
purportedly a supermajority-a large majority-of independent
directors.
The requirement that a majority of directors be independent is
being proposed by both NASDAQ and the NYSE.
In addition, the NYSE is also proposing requiring a regularly
convened executive session of the independent directors. They will
be required to regularly convene without the participation of the
inside directors.
Finally, the NYSE is proposing that each listed company have
an audit committee; a nominating committee-it could be called a
corporate governance committee; and a compensation
committee-three separate committees. Currently, there is no
required nominating or compensation committee.
Each of the committees will have to go through a couple of
procedural hoops, including promulgating corporate governance
standards, written charters, and conducting yearly evaluations.
They have to, in essence, grade themselves. They will have certain
discretion in how the committees are named, but basically, all
companies will have to have audit, nominating, and compensation
committees.
There really is no definition in the NYSE listing requirements
of who constitutes an "independent" director. Currently, the only
definition of independence is found in the rules for the audit
committee, but that definition does not apply to other areas.
If the NYSE proposals are enacted, the board of directors is
going to have to affirmatively determine that a director has no
material relationship. I think this is very important. As Mr.
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Peterson alluded to, that someone is truly independent is really a
question of fact, and the board of directors will have to
affirmatively determine that there is no material relationship.
There are increased restrictions for deeming a director
independent. There will be a cooling-off period for former
employees of auditors for five years. Right now, it is three. I think
it has always been a concern when former auditors end up being on
the board of directors. One must question whether they are truly
independent. The requirements also cover immediate family. I do
not think anyone would object to that.
So we have the tightening of the definition of independent
directors, both by NASDAQ and the NYSE; the requirement that
the majority of directors be independent, and then the requirement
for the three separate boards-the, nominating, audit, and
compensation committees-that have to be composed of wholly
independent directors.
Now, bad corporate governance is. somewhat like
crime-everyone is opposed to it, but the solutions for eradicating
it are where reasonable people disagree. I do not believe that
enacting these proposals would be a panacea for a lot of the abuse
we saw last year with WorldCom and Enron. Take Enron as an
example. They had a supermajority of independent board of
directors. Almost all large corporations in the United States have
a majority of independent board of directors. The NYSE report
claims that having a majority of independent board of directors
"will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the
possibility of damaging conflicts of interest." Well, I think the last
statement is certainly clear.
But I am not so sure about the first-what do we really mean
by "increasing the quality of board oversight?" There have been
some recent academic studies published within the last two years
focusing on board independence and return to shareholders. I
think ultimately that is what everyone is concerned about. By
having a board that is, in essence, controlled or captured by the
CEO or management, there is the potential for a lot of self-dealing
and for the shareholders to end up getting the short end of the
stick.
These studies have actually found to the contrary; they have
found that there is no relationship between independence and
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shareholder returns.
There are some questions as to how to measure independence,
and that is obviously a debatable issue, but the studies seem to
have found a negative correlation: the more independent the
directors, the less the shareholders have benefited. So I think that
these studies should give us some pause before jumping on the
independence bandwagon.
Since most large corporations already have a majority of
independent directors, corporations that are going to be the most
affected are the smaller, more specialized companies. For them, I
think the costs of having the three separate committees and having
a majority of independent directors may be substantial.
The report did not cite a single authority supporting their
finding that having a majority of independent directors would
increase shareholder return and increase the quality of board
oversight. This seems to be somewhat of an over-reliance on
anecdotal evidence. If a majority of independent directors is good,
why not a supermajority? Again, nothing in the report suggests
that a supermajority would be better or worse.
Another issue that has not been addressed is the relationship
between independence and compensation. Should we have the
directors' compensation consist solely of cash? Should we have it
tied to the performance of the stock? A lot of people have argued
that we should have some kind of alignment of the shareholders'
and directors' interests. But then, I think we end up facing some of
the similar issues that Mr. Peterson mentioned regarding
compensation in general, especially options. When you have
options, you create asymmetric payoffs: "good results--I get
rewarded"; "bad results-well I just have to find a new board to
serve on"; "something terrible happened-act of God; it is not my
fault."
The proposals may focus somewhat too narrowly on the
monitoring function-overseeing management-of the board,
which is probably its most important function. But there are a lot
of other aspects to being on a board-I think Mr. Peterson could
probably give us some insight on this.
Being a director not only involves monitoring, but also
developing relationships and assisting in strategic planning. I
believe here independent directors may be at a very significant
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disadvantage to quality insiders. Who is going to know the
business of a corporation as well as someone who has been up
through the ranks, knows the competitors, and knows the business
risks, better than an insider? Will companies be better off,
especially smaller companies, if they are forced to go out and
recruit independent directors, and have to rely on people who do
not have as much information and relevant human capital as the
current insiders have?
We have to be concerned with the requirement of separate
executive sessions. A board has to be an institution of collegiality;
it has to act by consensus. By requiring separate executive sessions
of the board, the proposals may create divisions between the
independent and executive directors. Query, what is going to be
the results of the decisions taken at these executive sessions? Will
the insiders be forced out of the decision-making process if the
decisions have already been made by the independent directors in
these executive meetings? I don't know. I think some distrust and
divisions could certainly develop among boards.
I have spoken enough. I want to conclude by saying that many
of these ideas or proposals are well intentioned but many of them
are already followed by most large corporations-in fact, they were
followed by many of the corporations that suffered disastrous
blow-ups--so I think we should not look at them as a panacea to
prevent future Enrons.
Furthermore, I think that they will cause significant problems
for smaller, more specialized companies that will be forced to find
independent directors. This may not be easy, given the potential
greater liability and risk that they may incur. Also, it will not be
easy for smaller companies with specialized operations to find the
person with the requisite knowledge.
I think that these proposals should be viewed with some
amount of caution, and perhaps some flexibility should be
considered, such as exempting small cap companies from some of
these requirements. That is it.
MR. PETERSON: Thank you.
John Foster is a member of the Federal Accounting Standards
Board, which has some fascinating history. I was telling John I
read much of Arthur Levitt's book. If we have time, I would be
interested in whether his recollection of history is roughly the same
20031
64 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
as yours, Mr. Foster.
MR. FOSTER: It is pretty close.
MR. PETERSON: Thank you.
MR. FOSTER: I am pleased to have the opportunity to return
to this conference this year. In the past, I have mostly discussed
the accounting for derivatives, and, since I was addressing lawyers
about accounting issues, I felt pretty comfortable. I am not sure
why I was not on the accounting panel this morning, but here we
are.
This year I am going to discuss the role of the audit committee,
which, with the recent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("Act"),
has become a legal issue. I do not feel quite as comfortable
addressing lawyers about legal issues, so I am not going to give you
an in-depth analysis of the law or the listing requirements of the
exchanges as they relate to audit committees. I assume that most
of you are lawyers or law students and much better than I at
reading and interpreting the law. Rather, I am going to focus on
the role of the audit committee and what I believe are the
necessary requirements for an audit committee to function
efficiently and successfully.
However, before I do that, I would like to focus on at least
some aspects, the fundamental aspects, of Sarbanes-Oxley, perhaps
the most important of which is making the audit committee
responsible for a company's relationship with its independent
auditors. In that respect, the audit committee is directly
responsible for the appointment, the compensation, and the
oversight of the auditor, and is also responsible for pre-approval of
all audit services and non-audit services.
Moreover, as has been discussed, the Act does require that
each member of an audit committee be independent. Sarbanes-
Oxley does define what is "independent." It means that audit
committee members "cannot accept any consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fees from the company, or be an affiliate of
the company.4
The Act also requires the SEC to issue rules respecting
disclosure as to whether the audit committee includes at least one
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745
(2002).
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financial expert; and, if not, why not. This provision, along with
specific exchange requirements that have been proposed, will
almost force companies to have someone on the audit committee
that has some financial expertise.
That completes my summary of the legislation, obviously from
50,000 feet. I leave the rest of the legislation and its interpretation
in your capable hands.
Before I go on, I have a standard disclaimer. The views that
you are going to hear today are my views, they are not the views of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board ("Board"). Those
views are only set through due process and long deliberations. So
keep that in mind.
Also, I have got a lot of notes, and I will make reference to my
notes during my remarks, but I hope you will excuse me and not
think, as Winston Churchill once did when he was asked by a
young Member of Parliament how he had liked his speech: "First
of all, you read it; secondly, you read it poorly; and thirdly, what
you read was not worth reading."
Audit committees of boards of directors have been in
existence for a long time. However, until recent years, I think the
role of the audit committee was often unclear. In fact, back in the
late 1970s and early 1980s, I was practicing public accounting, and
most of the audit committees of my clients thought that their
principal responsibility was reducing audit fees. I would doubt that
today members of audit committees share that belief.
Even before the recent failures in financial reporting and the
recent passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC and the stock
exchanges began to focus their attention on the duties of the audit
committee.
In 1999, the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the
Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, which was set up at
the behest of Arthur Levitt, who was then Chairman of the SEC,
issued recommendations to approve the independence, operations,
and effectiveness of audit committees.
In response to that report, the stock exchanges, including the
NASDAQ stock market, adopted new listing requirements that
were applicable to all listed companies, and the SEC issued a rule
for new disclosures about audit committees.
In response to Sarbanes-Oxley, those listing requirements
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have been strengthened. But, as I said, since most of you are
familiar with those requirements, I am not going to get into them
today. Even if you are not familiar with them, I suspect you will
get much more from reading them yourselves than having me
recite them.
I believe the most important responsibility of the audit
committee is to oversee financial reporting. The other key
responsibilities, evaluating the audit process and assessing the
company's internal control system and risk management
capabilities, are directed toward and support the primary goal of
quality financial reporting.
Many believe that financial reporting is the responsibility of
the auditors. But while the auditors assume responsibility for
attesting that the financial reports prepared by management fairly
present the financial condition and the results of operations of
companies, it is management, and ultimately the board of directors,
that have responsibility for preparing the company's financial
reports. Implicit in this responsibility is management's assurance
that the information is not only complete and accurate, but that it
can be relied upon by investors and creditors when they make
decisions.
I believe that much of the cause of what happened at Enron
and the other recent failures can be attributed to the short-term
focus of the entire financial community and the resultant pressures
on companies for reporting steady increases in quarterly earnings.
Companies that can achieve steady growth in earnings are
rewarded with handsome price/earnings multiples, and
managements that achieve steady growth are also rewarded with
what in my view are grossly inappropriate amounts of stock
options.
I have nothing against stock options. In fact, in the interest of
full disclosure, my personal financial situation was greatly
improved as a result of options that I received at Compaq
Computer Corporation. But I thought, along with everybody else,
I better get my two cents in about stock options, since I did not get
to be on the accounting panel.
My views are very similar to Mr. Peterson's. I would observe
that it was originally thought-and in some circumstances, it is
clearly true-that options align the interests of management with
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the shareholders. Recently, however, we have seen a lot of
companies re-price employee stock options when the share price
declines, and some have questioned whether management's
interests are truly aligned when the shareholders lose when the
stock price goes down.
Some might argue that, rather than aligning interests, there is a
clear conflict. Management, because it will benefit greatly by
increases in stock prices but has little down-side risk, has incentives
to enter into risky ventures that might result in spectacular returns
but might also result in significant losses. If a risky venture fails,
they will have lost nothing, having paid nothing for their options;
but they will win big if the venture succeeds. And generally, even
if the venture fails, management will get new or re-priced options.
Moreover, the volumes of options that are granted to
management are so large in many cases that management is given
almost perverse incentives to maximize profits in the short term
with little regard for the long term, and this tendency is
exacerbated by the fact that the average tenure of a CFO or a CEO
is roughly four years.
So we have a situation where management has tremendous
incentives to maximize reported earnings in the short term, and
these incentives have also resulted in management's pushing the
accounting envelope, and sometimes companies have actually
strayed from the requirements of existing standards.
The recent focus on the role of the audit committee, and the
new requirements imposed on it, are the result in large part, I
believe, of this tremendous pressure to meet Wall Street's
expectations. In the current environment, after the fallout from
several cases of financial fraud that led investors to broadly view
financial information with skepticism and to new legislation aimed
at improving financial reporting, a prudent audit committee would
be wise to assume the following responsibilities:
* Most importantly, the audit committee should understand
and evaluate whether corporate management has set a tone that
encourages quality financial reporting.
9 It should identify, through discussions with various operating
and financial managers, the risk and related financial reporting
issues that the business presents.
* It should also understand the company's critical accounting
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policies and assess the appropriateness of management's selection
of the accounting principles used in preparing financial statements.
e Estimates are a necessary part of financial reporting, and the
audit committee should understand how those estimates and the
related assumptions have been developed.
* The audit committee should review with management and
the independent auditors significant or unusual transactions,
particularly those transactions that occur near the end of a
reporting period.
* And, of course, the audit committee should review all
earnings released and quarterly financial statements to assess
whether the financial statements, including disclosures, are
complete, accurate, and fairly presented.
* In addition to direct financial reporting responsibilities, an
audit committee and its members should have a clear
understanding of the quality of the company's internal control
systems and the oversight of that system. Many, if not most,
companies have an internal audit department, and that department
focuses principally on the performance of the company's internal
controls and processes. To ensure that the internal auditors are
properly focused, the audit committee should be involved in
developing the internal audit department's goals and missions.
e In addition, the director of internal audit should report
directly to the audit committee, and both the audit committee
members and the director of internal audit should have unfettered
access to each other.
The 1992 Report of the Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission ("COSO Report")5
defined internal control as "a process effected by an entity's board
of directors, management, and other personnel designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives and
effectiveness and efficiency of operations, reliability of financial
reporting, and compliance with applicable laws and regulations."
5. Committee on Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission,
Internal Control-Integrated Framework (1992), available at
https://www.cpa2biz.com/CS2000/Products/Product+Detail.htm?csid=%7B1DC
6F23C%2D70C6%2D4816% 2DA3CD %2DAE70236B7992%7D&cs-catalog=C
PA2Biz (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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An audit committee should not only be familiar with that
report, which is called the "COSO Report," but could use that
definition to assess the quality of the company's internal control
systems.
While it is clear in legislation and other rules that the audit
committee has responsibility for relations with the independent
auditors, this is a relatively recent development. Prior to the report
of the Blue Ribbon Committee-and, unfortunately for some
companies, even after-the principal relationship between the
independent auditor and the company has been with management.
Yes, the auditors usually meet with the audit committee, but I
think in many circumstances those meetings are perfunctory and
that the auditors were very judicious in what was said about the
critical accounting issues and the management of the company.
Sarbanes-Oxley makes it clear that the auditors are the client of
the audit committee, not management.
In that regard, the audit committee should ask for-and
receive-frank assessments of the competence of financial
management, as well as the auditor's opinion on the quality of the
company's critical accounting policies and the accounting
treatment for unusual transactions. Only an informed board can
make appropriate decisions.
I want to return to an earlier observation, and that is the tone
at the top. It has occurred to me that one of the key elements in
each of the recent failures in financial reporting was the proverbial
"tone at the top." While the audit committee is not directly
responsible for tone at the top, it should ensure that the company's
culture prescribes appropriate conduct in preparing financial
information.
The National Association of Corporate Directors identified
four basic principles for protecting shareholders against fraud and
other illegal acts. I am not going to discuss all of them because
they are not directly on point.
But the first-and, in my view, the most important-principle
is setting the tone at the top through conduct and communications.
That is, establishing a corporate culture that is committed to lawful
and ethical behavior that begins at the highest level and permeates
the rest of the organization.
In closing, I would like to emphasize that in the current
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environment audit committees must be diligent and proactive, and
they must be willing to devote the time to develop relationships
with the independent auditors and with management responsible
for financial reporting to understand the company's business and
the risks it faces, including complex transactions that it enters into,
and to understand the company's critical accounting policies and
the effect of those policies on reported information.
Audit committee members cannot accept what is put before
them. They must ask questions. Moreover, as Bob Herdman, the
Chief Accountant at the SEC, said in a recent speech, "Asking a
good question is only half of the equation. Obtaining an
understanding of the answer is equally, if not more, important."
That wraps up my prepared remarks. I look forward to any
questions that you might have, or observations.
MR. PETERSON: Thank you very much to both of you.
We have about fifteen minutes or so for questions. Let me ask
you the first one.
Expensing of options is clearly the most public
controversy-Arthur Levitt calls the decision to back off his
biggest mistake in the book-and that the FASB members were,
by and large very much in favor of that. To what extent is that
your version of history and what does that tell you about the
appropriate way of monitoring and maintaining the independence
of FASB?
MR. FOSTER: That is a difficult question. I cannot crawl into
his mind as to whether he regrets that. I presume, since he said so.
But this was in 1993-1994, and there was tremendous pressure
brought on the Congress--in particular, by the high-tech
community, but it was pretty much universal-that expensing
options was inappropriate and the wrong answer-universal on the
part of the business community, that is.
I think that many people, including Chairman Levitt, believed
that the very existence of the FASB was threatened by this
pressure. There were resolutions passed in Congress and there
were other threats to undermine the independence of the Board.
My personal opinion is that the Board should have stood its
ground. In fact, I dissented to the statement because I believe that
political pressure is an inappropriate reason not to stand your
ground and that you give up your independence by folding. But
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the majority of the Board concurred that the Board was threatened
and agreed to a compromise which required disclosure of stock
compensation expense in the financial statements as well as its
effect on earnings but did not require it to be reflected in the basic
financial statements.
MR. PETERSON: What then was the fundamental leverage
on Arthur Levitt and on the rest of the Board members?
Budgetary, that Congress would not finance you? Or what? What
was the threat, in other words?
MR. FOSTER: The biggest threat was a bill that was
introduced by Senator Lieberman that would have required every
decision of the FASB to be approved by the SEC, so essentially
taking standard-setting responsibility out of the private sector.
6
That was the real threat.
QUESTIONER: Any comments on the exemption from
independence for a company that is controlled by 51 percent of the
shareholders and the period allowed for the independence to take
place after that situation changes?
MR. FOSTER: You mean with respect to independent
directors?
QUESTIONER: Yes.
MR. COLON: Actually, he is alluding to in the report or in
each of these proposals there is an exception for controlled
companies, so the parent/subsidiary situations are where you have
a substantial majority shareholder.
Again, the report notes this affects, incredibly, very few-less,
I think, than 1 percent--of the companies that are listed. It will be
interesting to see whether these companies' stock performance will
be better than the companies that are now going to be governed by
these. I think it will be somewhat interesting.
Yes, I think that is a good idea. But that was only put in after
there was significant pressure by parent/subsidiary corporations or
ones where there was a significant shareholder. So again, those
companies, control companies, are exempted from these
requirements that I mentioned.
But I think, again, it gives flexibility. It realizes that this kind
of "one model fits all" is not appropriate for all companies. I hope
6. Accounting Standards Reform Act of 1994, S. 2525, 103rd Cong. (1994).
72 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VIII
FINANCIAL LAW
that they give more consideration in the public comment-and-
notice period to exempting, or perhaps providing some safe
harbors for, smaller companies.
QUESTIONER: Do you think the SEC will go along with the
two-year period?
PROFESSOR COLON: He is also alluding to the fact that
you have twenty-four months before the independent requirement
becomes effective, so the boards that currently are not in
compliance have twenty-four months.
That I do not know. I do not have any particular inside
information. If any of the participants here or any of the attendees
do, please feel free to volunteer.
MR. PETERSON: I want to admit to a profound conflict of
interest here. We are one of the larger buyout funds. We have a
number of situations where we are the control shareholder.
We take the point of view-you may think of it as self-serving;
I do not know-that if we are talking here about alignments of
owners and management, we think there is a very close alignment,
at least in the companies we own, because when we do a deal with
management in the company we always insist that they put a
substantial amount of their own net worth into long-term
ownership of the business and that there is an up-front
understanding on the exit strategies, as it were, and typically they
do not exit except proportionately when we the owners exit.
So I think in those cases, at least the theoretical argument is
there is much more of an alignment of interests when a substantial
owner is involved in this matter compared to anyone else. But
others may disagree with that. I do not know.
QUESTIONER: Secretary Peterson, you made a point of
expressing disappointment that large stockholders, such as mutual
funds or insurance companies, accumulators of interest, really had
been relatively quiet on this issue. It seems to me that these are
asset holders, or stockholders, who in many cases exceed the size of
the companies that they are holding stock in. And yet, they have
really done nothing to force accountability, to do the sorts of things
an audit committee ought to be doing. They have just been
lackadaisical, if you want to use that expression, and have defeated
their fiduciary interest representing the people that rely on them
for investing.
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Can you make a comment about that and propose some
solution?
MR. PETERSON: Well, it is among my areas of ignorance to
understand what the dynamics might be that explain this
phenomenon. There are a couple of explanations that I have
heard.
One, while we talk at great length in America about long-term
owners, apparently there are relatively few such owners, because
the turnover, I am told, in stock--on the mutual funds, for
example-is 122 percent a year. So that there is perhaps a shortage
of people who are long-term owners. This does not diminish the
fact that our country as a whole has a deep public interest in the
viability of a company long term, for all sorts of obvious reasons.
The second reason I think they have not been involved has to
do with a kind of special conflict of interest that in my level of
naive ignorance I had not understood. Some of the biggest holders
of stock in companies are also asset management firms, and they
are soliciting business from the corporations that they are asked to
vote against in some cases.
In quite a few cases, we have been told in our inquiry that the
corporations contact them. I do not know whether you would call
it implicit linkage or explicit linkage. The implication is that "if
you really want our asset management business, we hope you will
remain friendly with us." So there is that conflict that results.
Third-and I would hope this is one of the reasons-there has
not really been a vortex or an axis around which such an effort
could be organized. We now have these three major
representatives who, believe me, are passionate about what we are
doing.
I have already written one hundred of the largest public
pension funds, and John Biggs and I and others are speaking to
them. We are going to suggest the following to them: that if there
is such a thing as democratic capitalism, it depends on the notion of
votes in a free society. We are going to propose that you review
our best practices and that you write to companies in which you
have ownership positions, and simply ask them before you vote
which of these best practices they currently have, which they intend
to have; and, if they do not, why not. Then, express whatever
displeasure you have by how you decide to vote.
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I used to be a CEO of a Fortune 500 company, and I can tell
you we used to track negative votes very carefully. At least in
those days, which was many years ago, when a negative vote on a
given issue had three percent or four percent or five percent, we
got very concerned about it.
You have a situation now where a small handful of institutions
control over half their stock. If only a small percentage of those
would get organized around a given set of best practices, I am
naive enough to think that it would make a huge difference.
The other thing that has to happen here, frankly, on the
corporate side is I think there has to be some private-sector CEO
leadership. If you think I am boring on this subject, you should
hear me on budget deficits.
But I have started budget efforts of this type in the past, when
I was concerned by the Reagan fiscal policy in the 1980s and what
it led to ultimately. What I found there was that if you go to a
large business trade organization, they are very much like any large
organization-they operate by consensus basically. Leadership
and boldness is not about consensus.
There is a brilliant piece written by Shepherd Mead that I read
once, called "The Glob." He pointed out that any important new
ideas have edges to them, and if you present that kind of an idea to
a group, they start filing off the edges and you end up with a glob.
What we discovered on the budget deficit was if we could get
six or eight or ten leading CEOs, men of real conscience and
boldness and so forth-like Jeff Immelt at GE, who is a classic
example-that others will decide maybe it is politically correct, or
socially correct.
But I think it is going to take some combination of private-
sector leaders in business and in the investor movement organized
around some best practices. And I think we are going to have to
persuade particularly the CEOs that this is appropriate not only for
positive reasons but for defensive reasons.
For example, in Congress today, there are proposals roaming
around there that, much like that million-dollar cap created all
kinds of effects, could have some very unfortunate effects.
There is one proposal being talked about, for example, that an
executive could not sell a single share of stock while he was there.
I am not smart enough to predict what the iatrogenic effects are,
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but you can be sure there would be some such effects. And there
are several other such ideas.
I gave a talk the other day, and Ralph Nader, of all people,
who is not one of my normal colleagues in life, said, in all good
conscience, "Well, Mr. Peterson, I would like to hear your reaction
to the proposal that all compensation plans would have to be
approved by a stockholder vote." Well again, I just cannot imagine
what all the implications of that would be.
So I think there is both a positive reason why the private
sector ought to get involved and there is a defensive reason why
they ought to get involved. We are going to find out whether we
can be successful in doing it. But I am a great believer in
volunteerism on the particular subject of executive compensation.
QUESTIONER: I was taken a little bit by your comments
about the asset managers, particularly where they might be seeking
other business but not want to be very active in helping on the
corporate side of the activities. With the proliferation of index
funds, I would be curious as to when, if ever, a Vanguard or a
Fidelity or the other mutual funds-and, indeed, the pension
funds-ever bought these index fund's holdings. For example, they
would have, let's say, four or five percent of that index fund
holding a Royal Dutch or Exxon, et cetera. It seems to me that it is
easy to escape taking a position.
Yet, these funds who have that fiduciary duty do not seem to
be stepping out and saying, "I will not be passive," even though the
investment is passive, and actually take an active role: "I will be
proactive in managing the activities of a corporation where I hold
shares in my fund." What would be your reaction to that?
MR. PETERSON: Well, I am sure you all know who Jack
Bogle is, of Vanguard. He is going to be one of the leaders of our
effort to get the investor community organized. He is extremely
upset about the passivity of investors. And, as you know, they are
major players in the index business. So I am hopeful that they will
get involved.
QUESTIONER: Coming back to the questions that are being
raised, I think this is a situation where you just need to have fewer
laws, laws that are unambiguous, as opposed to leaving it up to the
shareholders.
For instance, the $1 million limitation for management, about
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which I asked the Wall Street people, and they kind of snickered
and said they did not pay any attention to that and there were all
kinds of ways to get around it. Now, one way to have effect is to
have limitations that are meaningful.
And then, a second question. There is perhaps something
wrong with a situation in which' CFOs can retire with $50 million
salaries, $50 million retirement contracts, a couple of weeks before
they get sued, and then it is almost impossible to get the money
back without going through civil suits.Is there any way to get the
money back, aside from civil suits and criminal suits?
PROFESSOR COLON: That is our legal system. There is not
really any self-help in this area. For me, I am somewhat happy that
we have a system like that. I think we will see how this all plays
out. I mean, if there is fraud, there is fraud, violation of fiduciary
duties, there is a panoply of laws. Apparently, New York State
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer is invoking the Martin Act' here to
go after these people if there were abuses.
I think what we are looking for in the future, though, is to have
something in place that prevents this-having different incentive
structures, different compensation structures, to prevent just the
"being able to take the money and run" possibility.
But I think we still have not seen the end. There will be many
years of litigation for these somewhat unfortunate fellows. I think
we have not really seen the end of that yet.
Regarding the compensation, I think we have a system here, a
free market system, where companies should be able to pay what
they think is appropriate to get the best talent. Now, you and I can
disagree about how much is too much-you know, is Michael
Jordan worth that much; any of the baseball players, any of the
CEOs? I think here part of the problem is we want to make sure
that if they do get this compensation that they have earned it, that
they have added long-term value for shareholders. I think as long
as everyone else is thriving, people will have a lot less concern
about paying.
There is a competitive market out there, as I think someone
like Mr. Peterson could probably tell you, about good-quality,
reputable CEOs.
7. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (2002).
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QUESTIONER: I am hearing a level of complacency about
the corporate governance reforms that are on the table. It seems
to me that they are mostly corporate governance reforms that have
not worked very well in the past and would not do very much help
to prevent a future Enron.
Professor Colon talked about outside directors. Yet, a recent
academic study just says that there is no correlation between the
percentage of outside directors and the firm's profitability. The
proposals and the refinements to audit committees have been on
the table, and this Blue Ribbon Committee Report is years old and
certainly predates Enron, and it did not seem to have any effect on
the audit committee's practices there.
We can expense stock options, but we know, and we have
known for a long time, that the top executives get paid a lot of
money. That information is disclosed in the annual reports, and it
does not seem to provide us with a basis for reducing that
compensation
So isn't the idea of getting these best practices on the table and
getting institutions on-board really a kind of superficial response if
we really are in a crisis of corporate governance right now?
MR. FOSTER: I would make one observation. The data that
Professor Colon presented relative to independent directors and
returns-the notion that an independent director is just somebody
who does not work for the company. I think that under Sarbanes-
Oxley, if their definition of independent director is extended and
applied broadly, a lot of those directors would not be considered
independent-again, if that definition is applied broadly. Perhaps
there will be some change relative to that.
MR. PETERSON: Might I say, to add at least a slightly
optimistic note in this rather melancholy discussion, aside from
believing deeply in getting leadership in both sectors-and I think
you are going to begin to see some real progress-let's not
minimize the almost sea-change that is already taking place in
boards of directors that does not get widely reported.
I must tell you that I do not know whether it is a combination
of shame, pride, or even fear, because I think you are going to find
in some cases, that some guys will be going to jail.
If you can stand a little bit of levity, our President, for all his
other virtues, engages in malapropisms every once in awhile, as we
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all know. The other day, he reportedly said, "I think it is terribly
important that we get these guys in cufflinks."
That may indicate a certain social class or orientation. I do not
know.
I do not know-where there have been these egregious cases
of inattention, indifference, conflict of interest, self-
serving-whatever you wish to call it-I do not know whether
directors are going to get sued on a personal liability basis or not,
whether you think that is a possibility under American law.
But what I am trying to suggest is the board members I have
talked to in the last month or two-I can tell you that it is not just a
question of whether they are independent or not; it is a question of
how involved they have been. In too many cases, they have been
too uninvolved. I can tell you they are a hell of a lot more involved
today than they were two months ago in reviewing all of their
responsibilities.
Finally, so much has been said about auditors and
compensation consultants, and most certainly investment bankers,
and their conflicts, but I have had two or three experiences as a
major director of a major corporation where I have been less than
enthralled with the performance of outside law firms when it came
to investigating alleged improper practices of their regular clients.
In at least three cases, I have seen major law firms who were also
the beneficiaries of major fees for Mergers and Acquisitions
("M&A") and all sorts of other services.
I have been in private firms. I understand your compensation
is related to your revenues. I do not know that enough attention
has been focused, if I may, on what the ethics and the appropriate
practices are for outside law firms in the event of a truly
independent investigation.
I can tell you in two cases-and I do not want to go into details
here-of major corporations that, in the presence of an
investigation, used their regular law firm. I found their
"investigation," to characterize it most benignly, to be
extraordinarily passive, and in each case I hired my own law firm,
and in each case they came up with very different findings as to the
problem.
So I do not know whether this falls into the ethics of law firms
or the practices, but I do not think we ought to kid ourselves.
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So, having ended on a highly offensive note, I want to thank
our fellow panelists very much for their contributions. Thank you.
PROFESSOR RECHTSCHAFFEN: Secretary Peterson,
thank you very much for being here and sharing your thoughts,
which are exciting, and at the end controversial as well.
Once more, I want to thank Secretary Peterson. I think he
deserves one more round of applause.
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